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An analysis was made of then effect
of the Tender Offer Law in Chile, and
of the related situation of five coun-
tries with a more developed market
than the Chilean one, reaching the
conclusion that in order to success-
fully implement a Tender Offer Law
it is necessary to bear in mind that
the problem is not solved by estab-
lishing standards that regulate trans-
actions, but by creating instances
that contribute to a more dynamic
and efficient market. In addition,
there should exist a balance between
protection of the minority stockhold-
er and competition for corporate con-
trol.
Finally, we can conclude that there
is evidence that the Tender Offer Law
has depressed the Stock Exchange.
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INTRODUCTION
After 1995, foreign investors have
carried out transactions in the Chil-
ean market in order to acquire con-
trol over important local companies,
thus generating a large amount of
Tender Offers (IPOs). The legislation
prior to Law 19,705 of December
20th 2000, that regulated the Stock
Exchange were the Market and Se-
curities Law (18,045) and the Stock
Company Law (18,046), which con-
tained scarce juridical rulings re-
garding Tender Offers. We will re-
fer to different events occurred in
Chile, such as A) the take-over of
the Chispas stock (that grouped
Almendro,Luz, Chispa Uno,Chispa
Dos, Luz y Fuerza stock) by Endesa
España, B) the sale of Terra, CTC
Chile’s Internet subsidiary to
Telefónica España,and C) the case of
Campos Chilenos. We are also going
to refer to important international
studies such as the Zingales and
Laporte report. All the above gener-
ated the need to establish a legisla-
tive framework for regulating Ten-
der Offers.
The objective of this piece of research
is to analyse the Tender offer Law
in Chile in order to reply to the fol-
lowing queries: What is the effect of
the Tender Offer Law on the Chil-
ean Stock Exchange? What effect
does the Tender Offer Law have on
minority stockholders? What is its
effect on the dynamics and efficien-
cy of the market? and What is the
effect of the Tender Offer Law on
stock turnover? This paper is divid-
ed into seven sections. Section I con-
tains the methodology applied in the
study. Section II will analyse Tender
Offer laws in countries with more
developed markets than ours. Sec-
tion III will explain the reasons for
the need to legislate on the subject
in Chile. Section IV will analyse the
Tender Offer legislation in Chile.
Section V will refer to the Chilean
Stock Exchange. Section Vi will show
the effects of the Tender Offer Law
on the Chilean Stock Exchange, and
finally, Section VII contains our con-
clusions on the subject.
Section I. Methodology Applied
In order to be able to analyse the
Tender Offer Law in a country in
which Tender Offers started in 1995,
and which were finally subjected to
legislative order on 20/12/2000, it is
fundamental to understand and
compare the systems applied in
countries with markets that are
more developed than our own. Five
countries were chosen. France and
Spain that have highly regulated
systems and on the other hand, the
United States and the United King-
dom, that have more liberal legisla-
tions on the matter. We will also
analyse Germany, in its capacity as
a deregulated country. We will also
analyse the markets, because an
adequate analysis of different legis-
lations requires an awareness of the
fact that each system must be de-
signed according to the requirements
of the financial and capital market
it will regulate.
The common and most significant
parameters were established In or-
der to analyse the four regulated
countries are A) Origin of the Legis-
lation, B) Market History, C) Trig-
gers for announcing a Tender Offer,
D) Obligatory Offer, E) Information
to be provided, F) Duration of anOf-
fer, G) Partial Offers, H) Withdraw-15
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al Rights, I) Price, J) Squeeze Out,1
and K) Conclusions.
The principal hypothesis in this
study is:
1. The Chilean Tender Offer Law
has depressed the Chilean Stock
Exchange.
The secondary hypotheses are:
1. The Chilean Tender Offer Law
has triggered the closure of cor-
porations, and very few openings
of new companies in the Stock
Exchange.
2. The Chilean Tender Offer Law




In order to adequately understand
the motivations and the need to reg-
ulate Public Tender Offers, it is nec-
essary to understand how these
transactions are regulated in coun-
tries with more developed markets
than our own, and compare them
with what the situation in Chile.
There are highly regulated and less-
er regulated systems in the world.
We will analyse different systems,
principally those applied in coun-
tries like the USA, the UK, France
and Spain.
On the other hand, we will analyse
the situation in Germany, a deregu-
lated country, but one that has ex-
1. The possibility of a stockholder who has come to own a high percentage of shares in a given company,
being able to acquire the rest, at a price that is generally fixed by a qualified accountant.
2. This indicator is the result of the division between the amount traded and the stock exchange equity
during a year.
3. Fernández-Armesto, Juan. op.cit. p. 45.
tremely high standards of Corporate
Governance.
An adequate analysis of the differ-
ent legilsations involved, requires an
awareness of the fact that each sys-
tem must be designed according to
the requirements of the financial
and capital markets it will regulate.
We must be aware of certain factors,
such as concentration of ownership
and the benefits provided by control.
1. Obligatory and Total Tender
Offer Systems: The first of the ex-
isting options is the establishment of
an obligatory system of total Tender
Offers, a system that makes sure that
all stockholders can sell the totality
of their stock in the target company.3
This prevents the possibility of re-
maining as a minority stockholder in
the acquired company, in such a po-
sition that the controllers would be
unable to externalise costs. The out-
come of this would be that (in order
to acquire the target company) the
potential acquirer would have to pay
a price that would reflect the real
value of the corporation at the time
of the transaction.
The obligatory and total system has
the disadvantage of making acquisi-
tion costs considerably higher, as the
tender offer always involves an offer
to acquire 100% of the equity stock,
which discourages the corporate con-
trol market, reducing the level of de-
mand. In spite of the reduction of
demand generated by this system, it
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has the advantage of permitting that
economically efficient administrators
are the only operators allowed to
launch Tender Offers. On the other
hand, obligatory and total Tender Of-
fers tend to avoid those acquisitions
that are aimed at generating profits
by exploiting minority stockholders.
Two examples are mentioned; the
British System and the French Sys-
tem, which have the following char-
acteristics:
1.1 The British System:4,5 The sys-
tem that regulates Tender Offers has
the following characteristics:
A) Origin of the legislation: The
system is regulated by the 1985
Companies Act and by the City
Code on Takeover and Mergers,
issued by the Panel on Takeover
and Mergers.
B) Market History: The British
securities market is very liquid,
and company ownership struc-
tures tend to be dispersed,6 al-
though not as much as the US
markets. The markets are ex-
tremely liquid.
C) Triggers for Informing a
Tender Offer.
I) On acquiring a percentage of
over 3% of the equity capital
of a company
II) Any variation over 1% of the
stock, after having acquired 3
or more per cent of the com-
pany.
D) Obligatory Offer: The obligato-
ry offer is established in The City
Code Rule 9.1, which states the
following for an obligatory offer:
I) When 30% or more of the cor-
porate votes are reached.
II) When a stockholder owns at
least 30% but less than 50% of
the stock, he/she should an-
nounce a Tender Offer every
time his/her participation in-
creases by 1% over a 12-month
period.
E) Information to be provided:
In the British System, a Tender
Offer must provide the following
information: Name of the acquir-
er, Name of the Target Company,
Number of shares or percentage
of shares to be acquired. In addi-
tion, an affidavit stating the in-
validity of the offer if the total stoc
that accepted the tender offer is
less than 1% of the votes in the
company, The offerer can establish
a minimum number of shares to
accept the offer, the participation
of the offerer in the corporation
and the period during which the
offer will be in effect.
F) Duration of the Offer: The of-
fer must have a duration of at
least 21 days, and in those cases
in which the offer is modified, it
should be extended for at least 14
days. In the case that the stock
obtained is less than 50% of the
4. The law that regulates the British system is the “City Code on Take-overs and Mergers”.
5. Berger, Richard (1996) “A comparative Analysis of Takeover Regulation in the European Community”,
Harvard Press, 1996. pp. 56-62.
6. See Mayer. “Firm Control and inaugural”, Said Business School, University of Oxford, February 1999.17
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target company’s voting stock, 60
days from the opening of the of-
fer, the offer will expire and will
not be able to be renewed before
a year has elapsed.
G) Partial Offers: The entire offer
must cover the totality of the re-
maining shares. Partial Tender
Offers will only be accepted with
the consent of the Panel on
Takeover and Mergers.
H) Right to Withdraw: Up to 21
days after the closing of the offer.
I) Price: Cannot be lower than the
price paid by the offerer for tar-
get company shares in the preced-
ing three months. If offerer ac-
quired over 10% of the voting
stock in the 12 months prior to the
offer, the offer should include the
best price.
J) Squeeze Out: When the major-
ity stockholder has 90% or more
of the voting stock.
K) Conclusions: This system is
explained by the fact that the
British market is extremely reluc-
tant to accept the existence and
operation of corporations with a
controlling stockholder. This is
based on the fact that once con-
trol has been gained, there is a
non-liquidity problem in the tar-
get company shares, which might
damage the position of the stock-
holders who are unable to sell.
The establishment of the obliga-
tion to launch total Tender Offers,
gives all stockholders the possibil-
ity to disinvest without having to
apportion.7 Another explanation
of this regulation lies in the fact
that the British market has the
largest amount of mergers and
takeovers in the European scene,
and that it is relatively dispersed
and liquid, which has allowed the
current system to succeed in spite
of the kind of regulation applied.
France is another country that has
chosen this system.8 The French cop-
ied the British system in the sense
of establishing obligatory Tender Of-
fers, but the rule had another justi-
fication. It was based on the princi-
ple of equal treatment among stock-
holders, in the sense that the pre-
mium paid by the acquirer should be
proportionally distributed among all
of the stockholders.9
1.2 The French System: The sys-
tem that regulates Tender Offers has
the following features:
A) Origin of the legislation: The
system is ruled by Law Nº 351 of
August 2nd 1989, by the regula-
tions of the Securities Exchange
and by the regulations of the
Stock Exchange Operations Com-
mission.
B) Market History: The French
securities market seems to be
more similar to the Chilean mar-
ket,10 where there are few partic-
7. Fernández-Armesto, Juan. op.cit. pp. 41 and 42.
8. Lkaw of August 2nd 1989, ruling the security and transparency of the financial market.
9. Fernández-Armesto, Juan, op. cit. p. 42.
10. LaPorta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F.A., (!999) Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance
Economics 11, pp. 471-517.
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ipants. Concentrated ownership
structure.
The French market is highly reg-
ulated, and with an active partic-
ipation of state organisations.
C) Triggers for Announcing a
Tender Offer:
I) The legislation Establishes
the obligation of informing of
stock acquisition when these
purchases are in excess of 5%,
10%, 20%, 33%, 50% or 75% of
the stock of a company that
trades its shares in the stock
exchange.
II) In the case of acquisitions of
more than 5% of the capital
stock, a statement must be is-
sued giving the acquirer’s ob-
jectives over the next 12
months.
D) Obligatory Offer: In the case
that an acquisition involves over
33.3% of a company’s stock, the
Tender Offer must be made for the
total stock.
E) Information to be provided:
The report must include informa-
tion on the acquirer’s intention of
continuing to acquire company
stock, on acquirer’s intention of
gaining control over the company,
and of acquirers’ desire to be ap-
pointed members of the adminis-
tration board, board of directors
or Inspection Board.
F) Duration of an Offer: Mini-
mum 25 days, maximum 35 days.
G) Partial Offers: Obligatory and
voluntary tender offers must be
made for the totality of the com-
pany shares.
H) Right to Withdraw: During the
effective period of the Tender Of-
fer.
I) Price: When companycontrol is
the aim, the offerer is obliged to
acquire all the shares at the same
price as the price offered by the
controlling block.
J) Squeeze Out: The owners of
95% of the company stock are al-
lowed to acquire the totality of the
stock. The price will be estab-
lished by independent qualified
accountants.
K) Conclusions: Owing to its high
degree of regulation, the French
system has made takeover trans-
actions more expensive. Concen-
trated ownership structures sill
predominate in France, and this
has resulted in a less liquid mar-
ket than the US or UK markets.
2. Obligatory and Partial Ten-
der Offers: The second of the exist-
ing positions is the system composed
by obligatory and partial Tender Of-
fers, according to which offers may
be made to acquire a minimum per-
centage —as established in the cor-
responding regulations— of the
shares issued by the target company,
depending on the percentage of par-
ticipation aimed at by the acquirer.
This system on its own does not pro-
tect minority stockholders11 from the
11. It requires a good parallel system of corporate governance.19
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possibility of cost externalisation.
When target company stockholders
are unable to sell the totality of their
stock, given the apportionment sys-
tem, they are forced to remain as
minority stockholders, losing share
liquidity and running the risk of be-
ing exploited by the controllers.
We will now look at the Spanish sys-
tem, which has the following fea-
tures:
2.1 Spanish System12 The system
that regulates Tender Offers has the
following characteristics.
A) Origin of the Legislation:
Tender Offers for share acquisi-
tion and sale are regulated by
Law Nº 24 of the Securities Mar-
ket and by the regulations of the
Stock Exchange Operations Com-
mission.
B) Market History: The market
has a more concentrated owner-
ship than that of the US and UK.
C) Triggers to Announce a Ten-
der Offer: The petition to an-
nounce a Tender Offer is present-
ed in an explicative document
submitted to the national securi-
ties market commission.
D) Obligatory Tender Offer:
I) If, on acquiring or recovering
over 50% of the voting stock of
a company, the acquirer wish-
es to change the company by-
laws, the acquirer should pre-
viously announce a Tender Of-
fer to the company’s remaining
voting stockholders.
II) When the aim is to acquire
25% or more of the company’s
equity stock, the offer should
be made for the number of
shares that represent a mini-
mum of 10% of the capital of
the affected company.
III)When the acquirer has over
25% but under 50% of the com-
pany’s equity capital, and wish-
es to increase that participation
in at least 6% over a period of
12 months, the offer should be
made for shares that represent
at least 10% of the capital of the
affected company.
IV)When the aim is to reach a
participation of 50% or more
of the company’s equity capi-
tal, the offer should be made
for a number of shares that
will enable the acquirer to ob-
tain at least 75% of the capi-
tal of the affected company.
V) If the share participation of a
given stockholder exceeds the
participation percentages es-
tablished in II), III) and IV),
the partner involved cannot
acquire more shares than
those specified in those items.
VI)When a corporation goes from
open to closed, and the Secu-
rities Market Commission
considers that the minoirty
stockholders were harmed, the
corporation is obliged to make
a Tender Offer to all the stock-
holders that did not approve
the closure of the corporation.
12. This system is regulated by Law Nº 24 of the Securities Market and by regulations of the Stock Exchange
Operations Commission.
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E) Information to be provided:
When a Tender Offer is required,
the Spanish system requires the
submission of an explicative bro-
chure which gives a detailed de-
scription of the operation planned.
F) Duration of an Offer: The pe-
riod of acceptance will be estab-
lished by the offerer, and will be
no shorter than a month or long-
er than two months. The offer
may be extended with the autho-
risation of the Securities Market
Commission.
G) Partial Offers: Partial Offers
are allowed.
H) Right to Withdraw: Once the
offer has been accepted, there is
no possibility of refusing it. The
only possibility to recant would be
the existence of a new competing
Tender Offer with better condi-
tions.
I) Price: The price of the offer can-
not be lower to the teoretical book
value of the corporation, to its liq-
uid value, or to the mean market
value of its shares during the six
months prior to the application for
exclusion, regardless of the num-
ber of sessions the trading re-
quired. The previous counter-of-
fer price (in the understanding
that there had been a tender of-
fer over the past year), is valid as
from the date of the agreement of
application for exclusion.
J) Squeeze Out: Not contemplated.
K) Conclusions: This system does
not on its own protect minority
stockholders from cost externali-
sation. When target company
stockholders are unable to sell the
totality of their stock, given the
apportionment system, they are
forced to remain as minority
stockholders, losing share liquid-
ity and running the risk of being
exploited by the controllers.
Nonetheless, the Spanish legislation
contains various cases in which a Ten-
der Offer is obligatory.
3. Voluntary Tender Offer Sys-
tem: As opposed to the other systems,
in the case of wishing to acquire a
determined level of stock participa-
tion, (voluntary Tender Offers),13 this
system does not establish minimum
percentages to be acquired.
An example of this is the US system.
3.1 The US System:14 Before 1968,
Tender Offers were ruled by the Se-
curities Exchange Act and were not
regulated. During this period, a com-
mon tactic to acquire companies was
to announce an offer in the Wall
Street Journal, specifying nothing but
the percentage the acquirer wished to
purchase and the price offered.
The Williams Act was approved in
1968, and added sections 13 (d)-(e)
and 14 (d)-(e) and (f) to the 1934 Se-
curities Exchange Act.15
The system that regulates US Ten-
der Offers has the following features:
13. Parallel to this, a good corporate governance system is required.
14. At a federal level, it is regulated by the 1968 Williams Act that modified the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act, incorporating sections 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(e) and (f).
15. Soderquist D, Larry. Op. Cit- ‘- 36021
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A) Origins of the Legislation: At
a federal level, it is regulated by
the Williams Act of 1968, which
modified the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, incorporating
sections 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(e)
and (f).
B) Market History: This is the
largest market in the world for
Tender Offer operations. The
main factors that explain this are
a capital market with a very dis-
persed stock ownership, high li-
quidity levels and important sec-
ondary markets.
Detailed and exhaustive regulation
C) Triggers for announcing a
Tender Offer.
I) When over 5% of any kind of
share is purchased from an
open corporation, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) should be informed
of this operation. This infor-
mation should also reach the
relevant stock exchanges and
the issuers of the stock, with-
in a period of ten days follow-
ing the operation.
II) When a person who owns 5%
or over of a company’s capital
stock acquires more than 2%
of the stock over a period of
less than 12 months.
D) Obligatory Offer: No obligation
of this kind exists under any type
of circumstance.
E) Information to be provided:
The following information should
be provided: Exact number of
shares acquired, identification of
acquirer, his/her commercial data
and information regarding crimi-
nal causes. In addition, the origin
of the funds used in the acquisi-
tion. Detail of loans contracted
and any other contract related to
the acquisition. Number of shares
held. Detailed description of the
purpose of the acquirer on pur-
chasing the shares, including
plans regarding an eventual con-
trol operation, mergers or sale of
a large part of the assets of the
corporation. An affidavit should
also be issued if the acquisition
was made for exclusive invest-
ment purposes, and a detailed re-
port regarding the relationship
existing between the acquirer and
the target company.
F) Duration of an Offer: The min-
imum period is 25 days and the
maximum period, 35 days.
G) Partial Offers: Partial offers
are allowed.
H) Right to Withdrawal: During
the effective period of the Tender
Offer.
I) Price: If, during the effective pe-
riod of the offer, the offerer in-
creases the price he/she is willing
to pay, he/she should pay this new
price to all the stockholders that
accepted the offer.
J) Squeeze Out: Within the state
regulations, most states allow the
possibility of a squeeze out. In
Delaware, in the case that a ma-
jority stockholder has over 85% of
the corporate shares, he/she has
thefaculty to oblige the remaining
stockholders to sell their stocks to
the majority stockholder. This is
a squeeze out, and to fix sale price,
minority stockholders may resort
to valuations.
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K) Conclusions: At first sight, this
system would appear to contribute
to the exploitation of minority
stockholders, in the sense that it
allows the purchase of the mini-
mum participation required to
reach corporate control, because —
in spite of the apportionment sys-
tem— a large percentage of stock-
holders are forced to remain in the
corporation as minority holders.
But, regardless of its formal charac-
teristics, this system has shown that
it works well.
This is based on the high level of con-
trol applied on those corporations
that operate in the US stock exchang-
es, via the SEC,16 which reduces the
possibility of abuse on the part of con-
trolling holders. On the other hand,
the characteristics of the US securi-
ties markets have contributed to pro-
tect minority stockholders. These
markets are highly developed and liq-
uid, and include the operations of cor-
porations with property schemes that
are generally dispersed, which has
generated a corporate control market
that is both active and efficient.
Finally, it is necessary to mention
that a voluntary Tender Offer system,
such as the one that exists in the
U.S.A to protect minority stockhold-
ers, is practically unfeasible in coun-
tries that do not have structural char-
acteristics that are similar to those
that exist in this market.
4. Deregulated Tender Offer Sys-
tem:17 Countries such as Germany
have opted for a non regulated Ten-
der Offer system, but in order to com-
pensate for this, they have established
high standards of corporate gover-
nance in order to avoid possible abuse
on the part of controlling holders.
Germany chose an alternative system
for protecting the interests of minori-
ty stockholders, based on a severe reg-
ulation of corporate governments,
which tends to reduce the probability
of exploitation. These regulations are
based on the assumption that acquir-
ers will manage the acquired corpo-
ration in their own benefit, which will
have a patrimonial effect on minority
stockholders. This has led to the es-
tablishment of different protection
standards such as a system that com-
pensates minority stockholders that
decide to remain in the corporation or
to indemnify them in cash or in stocks
or certificates if they wish to sell their
corresponding participation.
The deregulated Tender Offer system
responds to the characteristics of the
German securities markets, which,
together with most of their Europe-
an counterparts, have a high owner-
ship concentration and are not very
liquid, so that the establishment of a
Tender Offer system would suppos-
edly go against the already scarce
activity presented by the corporate
control market.
In spite of the above systems, the
“Ubernahmekodex” or “Tender Offer
Code” was approved on July 14th
1995. This Code was created by the
“Boresensachvertandigenkom-
mission”, the organisation in charge
16. The Securities and Exchange Commission controls and regulates US securities markets.
17. see German Aktiengesetz Regultetions.23
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of controlling the German securities
markets. This code establishes the
recommendations for the contents of
a Tender Offer announcement, the
obligation of stating that the offerer
will obey the regulations established
by the code, in order to fulfil his op-
eration. This code regulates both vol-
untary Tender Offers, with regula-
tions similar to those existing in the
United States, and in the case of
Obligatory Offers, its Section 16 es-
tablishes the obligation of announc-
ing a total Tender Offer in the case of
acquiring control of a target compa-
ny. The same section states the mo-
ment in which a corporation has been
controlled by an offer. We can state
that this code establishes a system
that is a mixture of the English and
the US systems. As regards the En-
glish system, the Ubernahmekodex
has not gained the required support
within the German market for a sim-
ple recommendation to become sup-
port. In this sense, its use has not
become generalised, so that the Ger-
man Tender Offer system continues
to be to a great extent deregulated.
Section III. Need to Legislate
in Chile
After 1995, foreign investors have op-
erated in Chile with the aim of gain-
ing control over large Chilean compa-
nies. The legislation prior to Law
19,705 contained very few references
regarding ender Offers or IPOs.
Different events that occurred in our
stockholding operations led authori-
ties, regulatory bodies and the Stock
Exchange to address the Tender Of-
fer issue, which lacked a legal system
regarding a systematic, institutional
and organic treatment of these offers.
In 1997, an event shattered public
opinion, when Endesa España start-
ed to try to take over Chispas (Almen-
dro, Luz, Chispa Uno, Chispa Dos,
Lus y Fuerza) shares. In this opera-
tion, the corporate capital comprised
different series of shares and when a
detail of the operation was given out,
information showed that a specific
share series was offered a greater
economic value, in addition to other
benefits that were not available to
other series. The following were the
more polemic elements of the offer:18
I) The only stockholders that
were able to take part in the
Tender Offer were the stock-
holders of the Chispas corpo-
rations registered as at May
30th 1997, which is to say, nine
weeks prior to the announce-
ment of the purchase.
What would have been the
reason to exclude from the of-
fer those who acquired Chis-
pas stock after that date?
II) Endesa España paid three dif-
ferent prices for the tender of-
fer, establishing a difference
not only according to series
but also according to type of
stockholder. Even though, in
the latter case, they all had
assets with equal rights, hold-
ers of Series B stock (ex exec-
utive) were offered 200,000
per share, which is ninety one
per thousand per cent more
18. Maqueira, Carlos (2000). “Evolución de la OPAS en Chile y su regulación”. Rev. Economía y Administra-
ción, número 137. Universidad de Chile,. pp. 30-38.
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than the price paid to general
stockholders. At the same
time, the latter received an
average price that was 18.2%
lower than that offered to
workers, directors and former
workers that owned this kind
of stock. In this way, 37 % of
the total amount that Endesa
España invested in order to
acquire Chispa stock, was paid
to Series B stockholders, who
had 0.06% of the capital stock.
The questions regarding the efficien-
cy of local legislation to protect stock-
holder interests was also reinforced by
the subsequent sale of assets between
related parties, such as the sale of the
Internet, Terra Chile affiliate, of
Telefónica CTC to Telefónica España,
as was the case of Campos Chilenos.
These events are explained by the
fact that in those days, the legisla-
tion in force did not regulate the du-
ration of the offer, the possibility of
extension, the price to be paid, the
right of the stockholders that accept-
ed the offer to withdraw shares dur-
ing the effective period of the offer
and the conditions under which the
offer became nil. This is explained
because the laws that regulated the
Stock Exchange, namely Securities
and Market Law 18,045 and Closed
Corporations Law 18,046 provideded
very little regulation regarding this
type of operations although it was
finely tuned and regulated in coun-
tries such as Spain and France.
The executive provided the argu-
ments of University of Chicago’s
Professor Zingales to modify the
law. Prof Zingales stated “As the
control value of a company is noth-
ing but the current value of the pri-
vate benefits of the owner of the
controlling stock, the difference in
this magnitude depends on the de-
gree of protection given to the mi-
nority stockholders of each coun-
try.”19
Studies carried out on the way that
the legal structure of markets and the
protection offered to minority stock-
holders affects corporate ownership
structure shows the need to improve
the accounting system of a company
in order to give the market greater
transparency and to improve the ju-
dicial system. La Porta’s20 studies
analyse the laws that protect corpo-
rate stockholders, the origins of the
laws and the tools existing to fulfil
the regulations established in 49
countries. The result of these studies
concludes that Chile has work pend-
ing regarding the efficiency of the ju-
dicial system and the laws that reg-
ulate securities transactions in the
Stock Exchange. Mention is also
made of the need to improve the ac-
counting standards to be provided by
the companies, and the need to pro-
fessionalise in-company decision
making, independently from person-
al relationships. In comparison with
countries with similar per capita in-
comes, the above mentioned factors
19. Zingales, L (“000). “Por qué vale la pena tener el control de la empresa”. Published in Nº 6 Mastering
Management pp. 1-4.
20. La Porta, R, Lopez de Silanes F.A. (1999), Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Financial
Economics Ii, pp 472-527.25
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are below par. As Chile is a small
country with limited resources, this
differentiation needs efficiency ad
transparency.
Foreign experiences and the contri-
butions of foreign specialists lead us
to conclude that the operations of the
open market have been severely ques-
tioned in Chile, especially as regards
the lack of protection to minority
stockholders in operations that in-
volve corporate ownership. A stock-
holder may obtain important benefits
from corporate control operations.
But the potential costs associated to
a deficient legislation can be even
greater.
Section IV. Chilean Tender
Offer Law
1.1 The Chilean System:21 The
system that regulates Chilean Ten-
der Offers has the following charac-
teristics.
A) Origin of the Legislation:
Regulated by Law 19,705 of De-
cember 20th 2000.
B) Market History: The market
has a high ownership concentra-
tion and its share turnover22 is
low: 6.89%. This is equivalent to
stating that in a year a mere
6.89% of the companies operating
in the stock exchange change own-
ers.
C) Triggers for Announcing a
Tender Offer: When the aim is
to obtain control of a corporation
submitted to the control of the
Superintendency.
D) Obligatory Offer: An Offer is
obligatory when:
I) It enables a person to take
over control of a company.
II) Every acquisition that obtains
the ownership of 30% or over
of the stock of a given compa-
ny should be subjected to a
Tender Offer.
III)When after a share acquisi-
tion, a given person controls
two thirds or over two thirds
of the voting stock of a compa-
ny, this person is obliged to
make a Tender Offer for 100%
of the Company stock.
IV)When a person who aims to
acquire control of a company
that controls another compa-
ny, and makes a Tender Offer
for these shares that repre-
sents 75% or more of their con-
solidated assets, this person
must make a tender offer to
the stockholders of the latter
company in accordance with
the regulations established in
this Section. The above,
should include an amount that
is not lower than the percent-
age that enables this person to
gain control.
V) In the following 12 month pe-
riod, the new controlling stock-
holder will only be able to ac-
quire more than 3% of the
stock by means of a Tender
Offer and the price to be paid
must have a minimum value
equivalent to the control take-
21.  Regulated by Law 19.705 of December 20th 2000.
22. Value calculated with Santiago Stock Exchange - Annual Report (2002) data.
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over price. But in the case that
the acquisition is undertaken
in a stock exchange and in
apportionment operation for
the rest of the stockholders, a
larger percentage of the stock
may be acquired without the
need to submit a Tender Offer.
E) Information to be Provided:
The following information should
be provided: Financial, juridical
and business description of the of-
ferer. Minimum number of shares
or percentage of shares required for
a successful offer. Price and pay-
ment conditions. Duration of the
offer. Method by which the offerer
will finance the payment of the
stock at the end of the offer. Final-
ly the conditions or events that
might produce the revocation of the
offer and other general regulations
issued by the superintentency.
F) Duration of an Offer: The du-
ration of an offer cannot be less
than 20 days or more than 30
days. An offer can be extended for
a maximum period of 15 days and
a minimum period of 5 days.
G) Partial Offers: Partial offers
are allowed, with the possibility
of apportionment, provided that
the number of shares that accept-
ed the offer is greater than the
number of shares that the offerer
offered to acquire.
H) Right to Withdraw: Stockhold-
ers that have relinquished their
shares may totally or partially
withdraw them for the duration
of the offer or of its extension.
I) Price: Control Premiums are re-
lated to a price that is substantial-
ly higher than the market price,
which will be fixed annually by the
Superintendency of Securities and
Insurance by means of a general
regulation based on a percentage
that cannot go below 10% or over
15% of the market price of a share.
By market price we understand
the average weighted share price
during the 90 day Stock Exchange
price prior to the Tender Offer
without taking into consideration
the last 30 days.
J) Squeeze Out: This is not con-
sidered.
K) Conclusions: The most impor-
tant conclusions are:
The establishment of the obligation
to ake a Tender Offer for all the re-
maining company stock when 2/3 of
ownership has been reached has the
aim of giving the minority stockhold-
er a way out when his/her titles and
stocks fall because they are divergent
with those of the controlling holder.
It is important to bear in mind that
2/3 provides sufficient quorum to
make a variety of corporate changes.
On the other hand it is also true that
this might be the equivalent of forc-
ing companies out of the exchange,
reducing market liquidity and reduc-
ing diversification possibilities for
investors. The Tender Offer law has
not made the Chilean Stock Ex-
change more attractive for the com-
panies that look for financing nor for
investors, as a total of 37 companies
have closed between 2000 and 2002
and a single additional company has
registered with the Stock Exchange.
A balanced Tender Offer law should
tend to reduce conflicts of interest
between minority holders and con-
trollers, but it should also promote27
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competition for corporate control in
such a way that it works in such a
way that it provides maximum ben-
efits to all its stockholders. The Chil-
ean Tender Offer law contains this
fist element, but it tends to discour-
age current controllers from selling
their property.
Section V. The Chilean Stock
Market
In Chile there are 246 companies that
operate in the Santiago Stock Ex-
change, of which 20 have different
share series. Of these 20, 17 have dual
shares, 2 have three series of shares
and one has four series of shares.
The Chilean Stock Exchange has a
high concentration of share owner-
ship which increased in the 1990s- In
1990 the three major stockholders
had an average of 51.19% of the own-
ership of companies registered in the
stock exchange (the majority share-
holder had 39.29%), in 1998 the three
majority stockholders had 64.37% of
share property, and the majority
shareholder had 49.81%, in circum-
stances that the first shareholder to
own over 50% of the stock can easily
control the corporation, unless there
are pre-eminent control shares or
special quorum shares.
The main corporations traded in the
Stock Exchange are connected to fam-
ily interests or investment groups. In
1998, these economic group compa-
nies owned 76.04% of the Stock Ex-
change, while 62% of the corporations
traded in the Stock Exchange belong
to an economic group.23
As the Chilean Stock Exchange is
concentrated mainly in Chile, it is
important to see the high market con-
centration of the ten most traded
shares in Chile.
On the other hand it is also interest-
ing to see the 10 shares that have a
higher stock exchange value. The fol-
lowing table and graph show their
evolution over the past 10 years.(See
table and graph page 40)
In the year 2002, the 10 most traded
shares corresponded to 6 sectors that
had a greater trade presence. Electric
Power Generation and Distribution
(Colbún. Endesa and Enersis), Banks
(Bansander and Corpbanca), Telecom-
munications (CTC-A and Entel), For-
estry (Copec), retail (D&S), and Pub-
lic Services (Aguas-A). It is important
to point out that the 10 most traded
companies correspond to 62% of the
market and that 236 companies cor-
respond to the 38% of the remaining
shares. On the other hand, the 4 most
traded shares correspond to 36% of the
market total.
Section VI. Effect of the Ten-
der Offer Law on the Chilean
Stock Market
In 1997 there was an event that had
a strong impact on Chilean public
opinion, this was the fact that Ende-
sa España was trying to control the
Chispas Stock (formed by Almerndro,
Luz, Chispa uno, Chispa dos, Lus y
Fuerza). In that operation the capi-
tal of the target companies was made
up by different share series, and
when information regarding the ne-
23. Majluf N., Abarca N., Rodriguez D., Fuentes L (1998)., “Governance and Ownership Structure in Chilean
Economic Groups”, Revista Abente Vol. 1 pp 111-139.
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gotiations was given out, the public
was told that a series of shares was
offered a higher economic value and
other benefits that were not offered
to the other share series. In this com-
pany there was no restriction regard-
ing the amount of shares required to
have a determined number of votes,
or the reason for which Chispas, with
0.06% of the stock chose 4 of the 9
company directors. This was Endesa
España’s most questioned company
Tender Offer and was one of the most
important triggers for creating the
Tender Offer Law in Chile. Nonethe-
less, the only issue that was legislat-
ed vis-à-vis the dfferent share series
was to restrict their duration to a
period of five years, although they
could be extended for a further peri-
od by an Extraordinary Stockholders’
Meeting, requiring the vote of two
thirds of the total shares issued
(These five years are unlimitedly re-
newable)- But it establishes no re-
striction for the share percentages
required to have a determined num-
ber of votes.
The Tender Offer Bill contemplated
the elimination of the possibility of
issuing shares with different series,
as a way of avoiding the pre-eminence
of one share series over the company
and of preventing the possibility that
it received a larger control premium
than other shares. After an analysis
and review of important studies such
as the Crossman and Hart paper,24 it
was argued that the existence of cor-
porations with a separation between
economic and political rights does not
imply the expropriation of income
from minority voters. They also con-
clude that there is no certainty re-
garding the convenience of prevent-
ing share series from obtaining more
efficient ownership structures. Final-
ly, it was decided not to eliminate
share series. Nonetheless, we believe
that it is important to modify the Ten-
der Offer law and to establish a re-
striction between the percentage of
shares required to have a determined
number of votes. Not to do so would
give way to situations similar to the
Chispas issue we have just men-
tioned.
On the other hand, it is important to
observe that in Chile stock ownership
turnover, which we call share rota-
tion, is low,
This indicator is the result of the di-
vision between the amount traded
and the stock exchange patrimony
over a year.
The following graphs illustrate mar-
ket evolution since 2000, when the
Tender Offer Law came into effect.
We can see how the amounts traded
and the stock exchange patrimony
have fallen as a result of the fact that
the Tender Offer law obliges offerers
to make Tender Offers for the entire
stock in a company. This is due to the
fact that as 2/3 or more of the proper-
ty has been acquired, it encourages a
greater ownership concentration, re-
ducing competition for control and
making other companies leave the
stock exchange, thus reducing com-
petition for control.
24. Crossman, S. and Hart, O (1988). One Share One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control. Journal of
Financial Economics 20. pp. 175-20029
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The above has 3 negative conse-
quences:
A) Decrease of amounts traded (See
graph 2 page 41)
B) Decrease of stock exchange patri-
mony (See. graph 3 page 41)
C) Decrease in ownership turnover
(See. graph 4 page 42).
The Tender Offer Law has not made
the Chilean Stock Exchange more
attractive for the companies that
search for financing or for investors.
Between 2000 and 2002, 37 compa-
nies have been created and a single
company has registered in the Stock
Exchange.
Graph 5 shows that this law has en-
couraged the closure of various cor-
porations over the last few years. 22
stock corporations closed in 2000, 11
did so in 2001, and 4 companies closed
in 2002, with a single new company
registering with the Stock Exchange.
A single company has registered in
the stock exchange since the year
2000 (..See graph 5 page 42)
In spite of protecting minority stock-
holders, the Tender Offer law in Chile
has not made the Chilean Stock Ex-
change more attractive for companies
looking for financing or investors. The
creation of an efficient market should
not be based on the creation of regu-
lations that make it more rigid and
less dynamic. The protection of mi-
nority stockholders can by attained
by a balanced Tender Offer Law that
protects minority stockholders and
makes the Chilean Stock Exchange
more attractive for the companies
that look for financing or investors,
encouraging competition for control.
In order to do this, Chile requires a
law that is more flexible, together
with high standards in terms of Cor-
porate Governance.25
Section VII. Conclusions
In order to understand and analyse
the Chilean Tender Offer Law, it is
fundamental to make an analysis of
the Tender Offer legislations applied
in more developed markets. Spain
and France have extremely strict reg-
ulations regarding take-over and ten-
der offers, with ownership structures
that are more concentrated than
those that prevail in the U.S.A. or
England.
As regards the U.S.A and the United
Kingdom, the most important regu-
latory issue to be applied is that the
information gven out to the market
should be as complete as possible.
There is no better mechanism for
solving market problems than its own
specific strengths.
On the other hand, Germany has a
deregulated system, with extremely
high standards of Corporate Gover-
nance.
We can conclude that the legislation
should bear in mind ownership struc-
ture, market efficiency, the market
development of a country in which
regulatory measures are established
25. Establishes in the economy the regulations and standards that will rule the behaviour of controlling
stockholders, corporate directors and administrators, and defines their obligations and commitments vis-
à-vis external investors (non controlling stockholders and creditors).
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and the Corporate Governance stan-
dards of the country.
The basic problem is not solved with
the establishment of standards for
regulating transactions but with the
establishment of paths towards a
more dynamic and efficient market.
On analysing the Chilean Tender Of-
fer Law and its effect on the Stock
Exchange, a comparison between 31/
12/2000 and 31/12/2002 has led us to
identify the following effects that
have occurred since the creation of
the Tender Offer Law:
A) Stock exchange transactions fell
from 6,149 (MMUS$) to 3,439
(MMUS$), i.e. a fall of 44%.
B) The stock exchange patrimony
falls from 59,770 (MMUS$) to
49,869 (MMUS$), i.e. a fall of 17%.
On analysing stock rotation, which is
amounts traded/stock patrimony, this
percentage gives us the percentage of
corporate stock ownership that
changes owners. When comparing 31/
12/2000 with 31/12/2002 stock turn-
over ranged from 10.29% to 6.89%,
which represents a reduction of 33%.
(In the U.S.A. stock rotation reaches
approximately 90%). In Chile, it was
low in 2000, with 10.29%, and with
the creation of the Tender Offer Law
fell to 6.89%, which is extremely low.
On the other hand, since the Tender
Offer Law was passed in Chile, 37
corporations have left the stock ex-
change, while a single new company
has registered, which has resulted in
a decrease of the stock exchange pat-
rimony and a fall in stock exchange
transactions.
The conclusion is that in a develop-
ing country such as Chile, the capi-
tal market requires encouragement,
which is obtained with an efficient
market. And an efficient market does
not need standards that render it
more rigid and discourage its dyna-
mism; what it does need is the cre-
ation of institutions that flexibilise
market operations and competition
for corporate control. Minority stock-
holders can be protected with a dy-
namic and efficient corporate control
market, with few regulations and
high standards of Corporate Gover-
nance. The Chilean Tender Offer Law
has made offers more expensive be-
cause it “obliges” the distribution of
the controlling interest price among
all the interested stockholders. This
may make efficient purchasers unin-
terested in announcing a Tender Of-
fer, because it is too expensive, and
this obviously goes to the detriment
of all stockholders.
Another conclusion is that Chile re-
quires an efficient and dynamic mar-
ket, and this calls for laws that ren-
der the market more flexible in or-
der to stimulate a depressed market
that requires more stock exchange
transactions. It is also necessary to
stimulate a larger number of corpo-
rations to feel attracted by the Stock
Exchange and to prevent abandon-
ment. This would increase stock ex-
change capitalisation and greater di-
versification.
The recommendation would be to
modify the Tender Offer Law, elimi-
nating the obligation of carrying out
total Tender Offers, which in other
countries might be positive, but
which is not the case in Chile. In
Chile, the regulation that forces the
acquisition of 100% of a given stock
package when 2/3 of the stock own-31
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ership is reached, generates clear in-
centives to turn an open stock com-
pany into a closed corporation, mak-
ing companies abandon the stock ex-
change. On the other hand, even
though this law protects minority
stock holders, it is not encouraging
competition for corporate control, and
a balanced law must bear these two
fact in mind. What Chile requires is
more dispersed ownership and an
incentive in terms of competition for
control, so that there are more com-
panies entering the market than
leaving it. Chile should eliminate the
obligatory nature of total Tender Of-
fers and maintain voluntary and Par-
tial Tender Offers. This would make
the market more flexible, together
with improving Corporate Gover-
nance standards, thus protecting mi-
nority stockholders and increasing
the dynamism of the market.
Finally, we canconclude that there is
evidence that in Chile the Tender
Offer Law has depressed the Stock
Exchange. Proof of this is the fact that
37 corporations have closed and a sin-
gle company has joined the Stock
Exchange after the law came into
force. On the other hand, the reduc-
tion of the volumes trades has result-
ed in a reduction of stock turnover.
This proves both the primary and
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